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DISTANCE EDUCATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: THE REALITIES OF COPYRIGHT
LAW AND THE CULTURE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
With the creation of advanced instructional technologies,'
institutions of higher education are now able to offer distance
learning courses and even entire degree programs through a
completely new pedagogical environment. The enormous advances
in technology and the manner in which knowledge is created and
disseminated are bringing new challenges to higher education and
the application of copyright laws.
Across the country, colleges and universities are creating
innovative delivery mechanisms through distance learning
programs and "remote site" educational opportunities.2  Distance
learners can enroll in courses transmitted via satellite while staying
at home, or register via the Internet and then travel to a local site
where they can view a lecture that is sent electronically to a
television or computer monitor.3  Remote site methods of
instruction have begun to replace traditional classroom education,
in some cases, because they are generally less expensive, can be
made widely available even to students in distant locations, are
offered in a flexible fashion to meet students' schedules, and may
generate increased tuition revenues.
4
1 Distance Education Clearinghouse (visited Sept. 25,1998)
http'//www.uwex.edu/disted definition.html. Examples of such analog and
digital technologies include telecourses, audio and video teleconferences, closed
broadcast and cable television systems, microwave and ITFS, compressed and
full-motion video, fiber optic networks, audiographic systems, interactive
videodisc, and satellite-based and computer networks. Id.
2 Peter Applebome, "Educationmcom," N.Y. Times, April 4, 1999, at 4A26.
See also Ted Marchese, "Not So Distant Competitors: How New Providers Are
Remaking the Postsecondary Marketplace, " AAHE Bulletin, May 1998 at 3.
3 See generally DONALD E. HANNA AND ASSOCIATES, HIGHER EDUCATION IN
AN ERA OF DIGITAL COMPETITION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES (2000).
4 Ted Marchese, "Not So Distant Competitors: How New Providers Are
Remaking the Postsecondary Marketplace," AAHE Bulletin, May 1998 at 3.
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Without the encumbrance of campus boundaries, some faculty
are teaching distance learning courses through web-based
instruction, compressed video, CD ROM, and the Internet.* As a
result, the work of the faculty who are teaching these courses can
extend beyond the traditional classroom where previously there
were enrollment limitations resulting from classroom size. This
expanded access to faculty lectures has generated a plethora of
legal questions by faculty, faculty unions, 6higher education
administrators, and higher education attorneys.6 Since classes and
lectures can be permanently recorded and offered to expanded
audiences with seemingly unlimited possibilities for electronic or
video reproduction, numerous issues are emerging regarding the
ownership of materials that are presented in class. Faculty, for
example, can present a seminar to an empty room that is then
transmitted electronically around the world and then saved and
used by an institution for subsequent semesters. 7 While the subject
matter may limit the actual length of time that unedited material
can be used, particularly in rapidly changing scientific disciplines,
a course on Shakespeare could, ostensibly, be repeated
electronically for many years if an institution chose to do so.
The purpose of this paper is to examine legal issues pertaining to
the ownership of materials created for college and university
distance learning courses taught through new technological media.
The first part of the paper will include information about distance
learning, its development, and its contemporary status at colleges
and universities in the United States. In the next section, selected
issues of copyright law and the relationship of that law to higher
education will be addressed. The third portion of the article will
focus on the application of copyright law in higher education.
Finally, the paper will conclude with a discussion of the issues that
influence the nature of the policies that are developed to govern
distance learning in higher education.
5 See e.g., ANNE B. KEATING AND JOSEPH HARGITAI, THE WIRED PROFESSOR:
A GUIDE TO INCORPORATING THE WORLD WIDE WEB IN COLLEGE INSTRUCTION
(1999). See also KEN W. WHITE AND BOB H. WEIGHT, THE ONLINE TEACHING
GUIDE (1999).
6 Sarah Carr, "Chapman U. Administrator Studies Distance Learning's Effect
on Faculty Pay," The Chronicle of Higher Education: Daily news: 02/11/2000-
01 @ http://chronicle.com/free/2000/02/2000021101 u.html.71d
982 [Vol 16
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Distance learning, also referred to as distance education, is the
use of electronic formats and multimedia to provide instruction to
students at physically remote locations from where the instruction
originates! Utilizing the latest technologies in
telecommunications, distance education involves teaching students
through the transmission and receipt of course materials outside
the traditional classroom environment.9 "Distance learning is
instructional delivery that does not constrain the student to be
physically present in the same location as the instructor.
Historically, distance education meant correspondence study.
Today, audio, video, and computer technologies are more common
delivery modes." 10 Course or program requirements are completed
through remote communications with the instructor and include
one-way or two-way written, electronic or other media forms.
Most often, the instruction is delivered via interactive software,
satellite transmission, videoconferencing, or the Internet to
students who have registered for a particular course.
Many universities have begun to offer degree programs through
distance learning curricula, including at least one institution that
offers an on-line law degree." It was reported in 1995 that one
third of all institutions engaged in some form of distance education
8 Distance Education Clearinghouse (visited Sept. 25,1998)
http://www.uwex.edu/distedl/ definition.html.
9Id. See supra text accompanying note 1.
10 Virginia Steiner, The Distance Learning Resource Network (DLRN),
reprinted by Distance Education Clearinghouse (visited Sept. 25, 1998) http'I
www.uwex.edu/distedldefinition.html.
1 See generally Peter Applebome, "Education.com," N.Y. Times, April 4,
1999, at 4A26; Ted Marchese, "Not So Distant Competitors: How New
Providers Are Remaking the Postsecondary Marketplace, " AAHE Bulletin,
May 1998 at 3. See also Karen NV. Arenson, Afore Colleges Plunging Into
Uncharted Waters of On-Line Courses, N.Y. Times, November 2, 1998, at A16;
See also Pamela Mendels, Coming to a PC Near You: Virtual Lav School, Int'l
Herald Trib., October 5, 1998, at 13 (commenting on establishment of degree
granting program at Concord University School of Law, established by Kaplan
Educational Centers, a subsidiary of the Washington Post company).
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and that another quarter had plans to do so. 12  As an example of
the rapid growth of distance education offerings, in March of 1999
Jones International University became the first completely virtual
institution to be accredited, 13 and "by 2002, four out of five
colleges are expected" to have distance learning courses.
14
As distance education programs have proven successful, they
have been responsible for generating a new class of all-electronic
institution, "the virtual university."' 5 There is great variety in the
structures of these institutions. Some of these virtual sites direct
students to courses offered by traditional colleges and universities.
Other sites represent individual institutions, such as Phoenix
University,'6 that have degree-granting authority and have been
developed with the express purpose of offering degrees based on
distance learning curricula. Another common model is for
institutions to pool their resources to provide disparate courses that
can be integrated into degree programs by students.'
7
Most of the new on-line institutions have developed as a result of
geography or state politics. Some state higher education systems
and universities have joined with their neighboring institutions to
form virtual university consortia. Regional and national consortia
include Western Governors University, 18 the Southern Regional
12 Ted Marchese, "Not So Distant Competitors: How New Providers Are
Remaking the Postsecondary Marketplace," AAHE Bulletin, May 1998 at 3.
13 See "Information Technology," The Chronicle of Higher Education, March
25, 1999; see also Kelly McCollum, "Accreditation of On Line University
Draws Fire," The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 12, 1999, at A33 (noting
that the American Association of University Professors publicly criticized the
granting of accreditation in this case).
14 Jacques Steinberg with Edward Wyatt, "Boola, Boola: E-Commerce Comes
to the Quad, "N.Y. Times, Feb.13, 2000, at sect. 4, p.1.
15 Ted Marchese, "Not So Distant Competitors: How New Providers Are
Remaking the Postsecondary Marketplace, " AAHE Bulletin, May 1998 at 3.
16 Marchese at 4 (noting that the University of Phoenix, a for-profit, well
capitalized, and national in scope "branch office"- based degree granting
institution, has 48,000 degree credit students in 12 states. Id.
17 See infra notes 18-29.
18 The members are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, at http://www.wgu.edu.
[Vol 16
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Electronic Campus, 19 the Community College Distance Learning
Network,20 and the Common Market of Courses and Institutes.2 '
Some state university systems have created virtual campuses to
combine the electronic resources of their various branches. System
wide efforts include those of the Connecticut State University
System 2 and the University of Texas System.' 3 Statewide efforts
include those of California,24 Florida,
2 Indiana,26 Massachusetts 27
229New Yor 28  and Pennsylvania.29  In Iowa, university
administrators have proposed a virtual "fourth state university,"
which would coordinate technology resources and distance
19 Created by the Southern Regional Education Board, whose members are
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, at http'J/www.srec.sreb.org.
20 The Network includes Cuyahoga Community College, Dallas Community
Colleges, Foothill-De Anza Colleges, Kern Community College District,
Kirkwood Community College District, Miami-Dade Community College
District, Rio Salado College, and Sinclair Community College, at
ht '//ccdln.rio.maricopa.eduL.
Created by the Committee on Institutional Cooperation, comprising the
University of Chicago and the institutions of the Big Ten athletics conference:
Indiana, Michigan State, Northwestern, Iowa, Purdue, Pennsylvania State, and
Ohio State Universities, and the Universities of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Michigan at Ann Arbor, Minnesota-Twin Cities, and Wisconsin at Madison, at
http://vww.cic.uiuc.edu/CMCI/cmci-homepage.htm.
OnlineCSU, at http://vww.csu.ctstateu.edu/onlineesu.
23 The University of Texas TeleCampus, at httpJ//vww.uol.com/telecampus.
24 California Virtual University (courses and programs from public and private
colleges and universities), at http://www.califomia.edut.
2 Florida's Campus (courses and programs from public colleges and
universities), at http:/lvwwv.flcampus.org.
26 The Indiana College Network offers courses from Ball State, Indiana,
Indiana State, Purdue, and Vincennes Universities; the University of Southern
Indiana; Ivy Tech State College; and the Independent Colleges of Indiana, at
hltp"//www.icn.org.
Distance Learning Honors Courses is a pilot project created by public
universities and colleges in Massachusetts to offer four distance learning honors
courses for a limited number of students, at
http://www.umass.edulpubaffstdisleam/facpart.html.
28 State University of New York: SUNY Learning Network, at
http://snl.suny.edu/sln.
29 Pennsylvania Virtual University (a distance-learning alliance of West
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education efforts at Iowa State University and the Universities of
Iowa and Northem Iowa.
In the past, distance education courses were provided more
frequently as supplemental or continuing education offerings than
as traditional credit bearing courses. Currently, however, distance
education has begun to replace traditional classroom education for
some students; such courses are less expensive and widely
available, especially to students in remote areas, and are more
accommodating of the busy schedules of an increasingly
heterogeneous college and graduate student population.
As distance learning methodologies evolve and colleges and
universities across the country rapidly expand their distance
learning offerings, numerous questions regarding the use of course
materials, and the ownership and authorship rights of faculty and
higher education institutions are emerging. The controlling
legislation and case law to address these issues are found in the law
of copyright.
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
Intellectual Property
Intellectual property is a term that encompasses many different
forms of creative work. It includes the primary fields of copyright,
patent, and trademark law, as well as incorporating trade secrets,
unfair competition, and other subspecialties of the law. Generally,
intellectual property covers the principle rights governing the
ownership and disposition of an individual's creativity and is used
as a "short hand term to denote legal rights in products of the
mind."30  The genesis of the federal creation and protection of
intellectual property is found in the United States Constitution,
which gives Congress authority "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts by securing for Limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' As a result of statutes adopted
pursuant to that authority, authors have been given federally
30 Robert A. Gorman, "Intellectual Property: The Rights of Faculty as
Creators and Users," AAUP Homepage (visited March 6, 1999) www.aaup.org.
31 United States Constitution, Art. I, section 8, clause 8.
986 [Vol 16
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created property rights, in the nature of a limited monopoly, in
their original works of authorship.
32
Copyright Law: General Provisions
Prior to 1976, states and the courts defined rights and remedies
for the infringement of literary and artistic works through the
doctrine of common law copyright.33 Common law copyright
existed from the moment of the work's creation until the work was
published with the authority of the copyright owner.34  If the
statutorily required copyright notice appeared on all publicly
distributed copies of the work, it then came under federal copyright
protection; without the required copyright notice, the work entered
the public domain.35 In either case, at the time of publication,
common law protection ceased.36
The 1976 Copyright Act made federal copyright protection
attach not from the moment of a work's ublication, but from the
moment of first fixation in tangible form. 7 However, because the
1976 Act extends federal protection only to works that are fixed in
a "tangible medium of expression," the 1976 Act leaves protection
32 See generally the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, PL 94-553, 94th Cong.,
90 Stat. 2541 October 1976 codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1101(1995). See also various state statutes.
33 Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines
173 (4th ed.1997).34 id
35 Id.
36 id
37 17 U.S.C. § 301 effectively abolishes common law copyright for most
purposes, stating:
On and after January 1, 1976, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression
and come within the subject matter of copyright as specific by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by the title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to
any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.
2000 987
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of unfixed works to state common law and does not entirely
eliminate common law copyright.38
Copyright law generally places ownership of intellectual
property in the hands of the author or creator of the work. Under
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, "original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression that can be perceived,
reproduced, or communicated, whether directly or with the aid of a
machine or device" are copyrightable. 39 Compilations and
derivative works are also covered by this Act.40 However, the
Copyright Act specifically provides that its protection does not
extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form .... .'
The requirement of "fixation" is satisfied when the work is
"embodied in a medium" that is "sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
42
This means that copyright attaches to a work, and protection under
the 1976 Act begins, immediately when the work is "fixed in a
tangible medium."43 A work will not be fixed under the Act unless
it was embodied in a copy or phonorecord "by or under the
authority of the author." 44 Consequently, states can protect works
that are only "projected briefly on a screen shown electronically on
38 H.R. Rep. No.94-1476, 94th Cong., Sess. 131 (1976). The House Report on
the 1976 Act identifies examples of "unfixed" works that remain subject to state
protection: choreography that has never been filmed or notated, extemporaneous
speech, live broadcasts, and improvised dramatic skits or musical composition
not recorded. Id. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK
AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINEs 173 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that Congress
attempted to address distinctions in the concept of "publication" between state
and federal law because Congress' concern was that states' definitions of
"publication" and extension of common law copyright past a reasonable point
where the author began to receive economic rewards, would seriously affront the
constitutional injunction of protection only for "limited times").
'9 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a).
40 Id. §§ 101, 103.
41 Id. § 102 (b).
42 17 U.S.C. § 101. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
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a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in
the memory of a computer. '4s As applied in the area of distance
learning, the considerations regarding the manner and moment of
fixation become important due to the variety and complexity of the
media used to "fix" information in a tangible form that allows for
its transmission.
The Supreme Court has declared that pure facts are not
copyrightable and that originality is a constitutional requirement
for protection.46 The concept of originality does not require that the
work be novel or unique but only that it originates with the
particular author,47 as an independent creation by the author (as
opposed to being copied from other works) and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity." 48 It is possible,
therefore, that a copyrightable work may be based on something
already in the public domain or on someone else's idea.
Conversely, if a copyright is properly obtained, it will protect the
author against the unauthorized copying of the author's work not
4
' H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976). State law, could, for
example, protect a musical performance against recording by an audience
member without the performer's permission.
46 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991). A telephone utility brought a copyright infringement action against a
publisher of an area-wide telephone directory for a publisher's use of listings in
the utility's local white pages. The Court held that as a constitutional matter,
copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more
than a de minimis quantum of creativity. Id. at 363.
47 Id. at 345. Justice O'Connor writing for the Court stated: "The sine qua
non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must
be original to the author. See also P. GOLDsTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 (1996)
stating
Courts apply the originality standard differently to different
types of subject matter. . .. Some courts have resolved the
problem of originality in cases involving fact works,
functional works, and works of visual arts by engrafting one or
more of three requirements onto the basic originality standard-
-a novelty threshold, a quantitative threshold, and an
expenditure of labor threshold.
Id4 8 Feist Publications at 345 (199 1).
2000
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only in its original form, but in any other fixed tangible medium
the author created as well.49
The primary objectives behind the copyright laws are the need to
encourage and reward creativity and the desire to promote the
dissemination of information that is deemed useful to the public.
From both legal and practical perspectives, sound copyright laws
are imperative to foster a societal ethos of creativity. Giving
authors or creators the exclusive right to exploit the fruits of their
labor encourages creativity; limiting the authors' exclusive rights
in both duration and scope supports the public's "right to know."
50
The available protections for a copyrighted work include the
exclusive right to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works
based on it, and to sell, rent, lease, or lend it.51 The Act also
provides for the exclusive right to perform or display the work
publicly if it is a "literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic,
pantomime, motion picture, or other visual work, as well as the




Because a copyright is considered property under the law, like
other types of property it may be transferred by the owner, in
whole or in part, to other parties. 53 In other words, any of the
ownership rights in the copyright may be sold, licensed,54 or given
49 Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1980), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
so James B. Wadley, An Introduction to Copyright Protection of Computer
Programs and the Semi-Conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984. J. Kansas Bar
Assoc. July 1986, at 8, reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ACADEME: A
LEGAL COMPENDIUM, EDWARD 0. ANSELL ED., National Association of College
and University Attorneys (1991).
" 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1),(2),(3).
52 Id. at § 106 (4), (5). See also §§ 113-118 for limitations on the scope of
exclusive rights.
53 17 U.S.C. § 201 (providing ownership of a copyright "may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may
be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of
intestate succession").
54 A license is defined as a revocable permission to commit some act that
would otherwise be unlawful. An exclusive license gives the licensee the
[Vol 16
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away. As with other property, these rights enable a copyright
owner to "both do the things identified in the rights as well as
exclude others from doing them." 55 As such, a copyright not only
provides a primary means to protect the author's investment, but it
may have considerable intrinsic economic value. Copyright
ownership transfer rights, therefore, have significant implications
for both individual faculty members and universities and render the
nature of the authorship and ownership of courses taught in a
distance learning mode economically important.56
Works Made for Hire7
Copyright law generally places ownership, and therefore
copyright, of intellectual property in the author or creator of the
work,5 that is, "the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection."' 5 If an
individual creates the work, that individual is then the author of the
work and the copyright owner. The Copyright Act's "work made
for hire" doctrine, however, provides a major exception to the
fundamental principle that copyright ownership vests initially in
the individual who creates the work.60 If an individual is an
exclusive right to perform the licensed act and prohibits the licensor from
granting that right to anyone else. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.1990).
' PAUL GOLDSTEiN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADFMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 618 (4th ed. 1997).
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 202. This section states in pertinent part:
Ownership of a copyright ... is distinct from ownership of
any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer
of ownership of any material object... does not... convey
any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object;
nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of
ownership of a copyright.., convey property rights in any
material object. Id
See also supra text accompanying note 53 and infra text accompanying notes
136-138.
57 17 U.S.C. § 101. See infra text accompanying note 62.
5" 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (providing that copyright "vests initially in the author or
authors of the work").
59 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,735 (1985).
60 Id. § 201 (b). Ownership of copyright by the employer rather than the
employee was first implicitly recognized in Bleistein v. Donaldson
2000
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employee of a company or university working within the scope of
employment, or is a "commissioned" author, then the work may be
considered to be a "work for hire," and the company or university
could be the owner of the copyright. 6'
The Copyright Act's "work made for hire" definition62 is two-
pronged and provides that a work will be "for hire" if it falls within
one of the following two provisions: (a) whenever an employee, in
the normal course of employment, creates something which may
be copyrighted; 63 or, (b) if an independent contractor and an
employer "expressly agree in a written instrument" that the work to
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (holding that advertisements produced
by several employees belonged to the employer).
61 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
62 Id. § 101. This section provides in pertinent part:
A 'work made for hire' is--(1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a
work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the
purpose of the foregoing sentence, a 'supplementary work' is
a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a
work by another author for the purpose of introducing,
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting
upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as
forwards, afterwards, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts,
tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material
for tests bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
'instructional text' is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work
prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in
systematic instructional activities.
63 Id. § 101 (1). The Act does not define the terms "employee" or "scope of
employment." In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1985), the court determined that "in light of the Act's express objective of
creating a national uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory
and common-law copyright regulations... the term employee' should be
understood in light of the general common law of agency." Id. at 740-4 1. The
Reid court also determined that the language of the Act "does not support" a
definition of employee to mean only "a formal, salaried employee" but that the
non-exhaustive list of factors found in the Restatement of Agency § 220 (2)
should be applied. Id. at 743, n. 8 and n.3 1.
[Vol 16
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be created "shall be considered a work made for hire" and if the
work was "specially ordered or commissioned for use" within one
of nine categories enumerated in the Copyright Act.54 There is a
dearth of case law identifying the appropriate analysis to apply in
drawing a statutory line between works written to special order or
on commission that should be considered as "works made for hire"
and those that should not.
65
Under the "work made for hire" doctrine, the employer is
considered both the author and copyright owner of the work so that
copyright ownership for a work made by an employee belongs to
the employer. On the other hand, if the creation of the work falls
outside the scope of employment, then the employee, not the
employer, is entitled to copyright ownership of the work. While
the "work made for hire" doctrine generally applies to employees,
a work may be for hire even though the creator is not a paid
employee in the real sense of the word, for example, when the
creator is a volunteer.
67
64 Id § 101 (2). These categories are: contribution to a collective work,
translation, supplementary work, compilation, instructional text, test, answer
material for a test, atlas, or part of a motion picture or audiovisual work. This is
the traditional standard which developed under the Copyright Act of 1909
(Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. 320, §§ 1-65 (amended entirely))
which Congress chose to retain as the standard in the Copyright Act of 1976.
65 But see Copyright Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
120-121 (1976) (identifying and discussing
specific categories of commissioned works that can be
considered works made for hire' under certain
circumstances .... Of these, one of the most important
categories is that of instructional texts.' ... The concept is
intended to include what might be loosely called textbook
material,' whether or not in book form or prepared in the form
of text matter. The basic characteristic of instructional texts'
is for the purpose of their preparation for use in systematic
instructional activities,' and they are to be distinguished from
works prepared for use by a general readership.).
6 Id. § 101 (1). See also Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (stating that "[t]o determine
whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court first should ascertain, using
principles of general common law of agency, whether the work was prepared by
an employee or an independent contractor. After making this determination, the
court can apply the appropriate subsection of § 10 L.").
67 Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (where town
owned copyright to manual written by volunteer).
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The effect of a contract is to create the employee-employer or
master-servant relationship foreseen by the Copyright Act of 1976.
Under current law, the employer owns the copyright in a work
made within the scope of employment and is free to use it at will,
without obtaining the permission of, or paying any royalties to, the
employee. Even in the situation where the employee would
normally retain original authorship, an employment contract
between the author and employer can serve to shift ownership from
the author to the employer, unless the contract stipulates that the
creation of copyrightable material is not within the scope of
employment or that the employer waives his or her rights to all or
specific types of materials created by the employee. In many
colleges and universities, faculty members are bound by
collectively negotiated contracts, while in other institutions the
employment contracts are simple and do not give any unique rights
to faculty members. 68 In the majority of universities where
employment contracts are common, faculty members are not
protected by a specific clause in the contract requiring that they
retain ownership rights in any copyrightable material they produce.
Without an explicated right to the copyright of materials prepared
or developed under the auspices of the employer, arguably the
faculty member statutorily is an employee working within the
scope of employment and waives any right to retain copyright
ownership of any materials developed.
Application of "Work Made For Hire" to University Faculty
Prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, United
States law specifically recognized a "text book exception" to the
"work made for hire" rule.6  This exception placed ownership of
an instructor's intellectual property in the instructor. As such,
lecture notes, syllabi, and textbooks, for example, prepared by an
instructor, even within the scope of his or her regular employment,
68 See generally Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made for
Hire" under the 1976 Copyright Act? 9 J. COLL. & UNIV. LAW 485 (1982).
69 See Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075; MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03 [B][1][b][i] (1997). Although there are no American
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were the property of the instructor and not the institution. When
Congress passed the current copyright law, however, it omitted the
text book exception.7 ° This is not to say that Congress expressly
repealed the provision. Rather, the provision simply was not
included.
Instructional text is defined in the 1976 statute as "a literary,
pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication with the
purpose of use in systematic instructional activities." 71 According
to Goldstein, the intent of the law is to include a category of "text
book material," regardless of whether its format is in "book form
or prepared in the form of text matter."72 Nevertheless, the vast
majority of colleges and universities in the United States continue
to honor the text book exception--a fact reflected in the actions of
faculty members regarding their publications.73
Unlike copyright policies, many universities have long-standing
institutional patent regulations governing the arrangements
between faculty and the institution to define the ownership and
financial relationships associated with the products of research.
Indeed, patent policies and procedures governing intellectual
property and technology transfer have existed at most research
universities for many years. Such guidelines provide a legal
framework to ensure institutional oversight and ownership of
scientific discoveries that may generate substantial income for the
university while providing some portion of the royalties to faculty
' See Hays v. Sony Corp of America, 847 F.2d 412, 416 (noting in dicta that
although the "teacher exception" no longer appears in the text of the Copyright
Act, there also is no legislative record of an affirmative Congressional action to
abolish the "teacher exception").
71 17 U.S.C. § 101. See supra text accompanying notes 62, 63.
72 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEIARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRiEs 618 (4th ed. 1997).
73 See e.g., Brown University Patent and Invention Policy http'//facgov.brovn.
edu/facgov/facrulesfolder/part5/sectll /Sectl 1.html; Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Research Policies and Public and Private Support,
http://web.mit.edu/afs/athena.mit.edu/org/p/policies/14.0.html; Stanford
University, Research Policies Handbook, http://wwv-leland.stanford.edu
//dept/DoR/RPH.html; University of Iowa, Sponsored Research Regulations and
Procedures, http://www.uiowa.edu/-vpr/research/rrap.html; University of
Minnesota, Policy on Patents and Technology Transfer httpJ/vwl.umm.edul
regentslpolicies/academic/Patentsand TechnologyTransfer.pdf. See also sample
policies on the Internet and others on file with the author.
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members and/or their academic department and research center.
That patent policies have received significant attention in higher
education is not surprising-the results of campus-based research
can be enormously lucrative.
In the context of intellectual property that can generate profits,
the work of faculty has been generally defined as the labor of
"work for hire employees," even though faculty members and their
departments tend to benefit directly from the agreement. These
arrangements are not unlike the agreements that faculty and
universities have forged when a faculty member is awarded a grant
from an outside agency and the institution receives a portion of
that funding for operating and overhead costs. When the results of
the grant-funded research are significant, patent policies are then
employed to insure that the institution is a direct beneficiary of the
work and intellectual property of the faculty member.
Until now, copyright ownership in university settings has not
been thoroughly investigated or codified because there has not
been an easily identifiable financial benefit to the institution in
asserting its ownership rights. Perhaps that is why the custom of
faculty ownership of written work has been so strong and has gone
unchallenged--the institution could gain very little from doing so.
For example, given the exorbitant costs of publishing, even the
most widely sold textbook brings minimal income to the author.
With the growth of the Internet, and the development of new media
to share intellectual property, however, colleges and universities
have begun to assert their presumed ownership rights to
copyrightable material in addition to the patents and trademarks
developed under institutional auspices.
In the area of distance learning, the proliferation in the number
of electronically based courses over the last decade has led
colleges and universities to reexamine the ownership issue from
multiple perspectives. On the one hand, institutions believe that
they have proprietary rights because the use of instructional
resources in the development of such courses has contributed to the
institutional perspective that it is a partner in the course.74 On the
other hand, faculty argue that they are the sole owners of their
instructional materials and should not be expected to enter into
74 Kenneth D. Salomon, Electronic Course Ownership and Use Policies,
Virtual University News, 1998.
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contractual agreements with their employers regarding the
ownership of their course materials. 75 Additionally, with the
advances in technology, universities now have the capability to use
course materials for multiple semesters, without additional
compensation, negotiations, or involvement of the parties (faculty
and staff) who originally "perform" or "produce" the materials or
the course. This development, coupled with the potential financial
windfalls associated with distance learning, has resulted in both
faculties and university administrators reconsidering the ownership
of course materials.
76
As copyright owner, the employer is free to create new editions,
revisions, and derivative works, although universities have not, in
the main, exercised their right to do so. In the context of the
university setting, the strict imposition of the work for hire
approach would seriously undermine the relationship of faculty to
their universities and would probably lead to much more strongly
articulated and complicated provisions in faculty collective
bargaining agreements and employment contracts.
Colleges and the Courts
Given the litigious nature of United States society, it is unique
that the concept of works made for hire has not been applied to the
scholarly writings of college and university professors who are
employed specifically to conduct research and to publish, as well
as to teach. The question of who owns the copyright to scholarly
writings has only been presented in federal court as peripheral to
' See generally CoMffIrEE R ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, REPORT ON DISTANCE LEARNING
(November 1997).
76 Id Given the ability to record lectures in a fixed medium for repeated use,
faculty are also questioning the length of contractual agreements and how long
institutions will be able to enroll students in distance learning courses that were
originally prepared for a single class. Under the 1976 Act, the duration of
copyright protection was the life of the author plus 50 years, except in cases of
"works for hire," where the duration was 75 years from year of first publication
or 100 years from year of creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
Title I of Public Law No. 105-298, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (signed into law on October 27,1998) effectively extended the term of all
subsisting and future copyrights by twenty years so that the term of the
copyright is currently the life of the author plus 70 years.
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claims of unjust employment termination, 7 7 although it has been
treated in state courts under the doctrine of common law copyright.
In Williams v. Weisser,78 decided on the basis of state common
law copyright before the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act,
Williams, an assistant professor of anthropology at UCLA,
successfully enjoined the commercial publication of notes taken by
a student at Williams' lectures. The California court, applying
California law, rejected the claim of the infringing student that
copyright in the lecture notes was held by the University rather
than by Williams. The court emphasized academic custom and
noted the anomaly that would result from a contrary approach
barring a professor from delivering lectures at one school that were
prepared while employed at another institution. Addressing the
distinction between writings and lectures, the court noted that the
"oral delivery of classroom lectures by a university professor did
not constitute a publication divesting his common law copyright to
his lectures."
79
More recently, in Weinstein v. Illinois, an assistant professor at
the University of Illinois brought an action against the university
for his wrongful dismissal.80  One of the causes of action
Weinstein brought against the university pertained to the
institution's permitting the publication of an article that he co-
authored listing his name third in the sequence of authors, rather
77 See Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297,
1308 (D. Colo.1998) (holding that professor's creation of an outline, even
though prepared on his own time, connected directly with the work which he
was employed to do and was fairly and reasonably incidental to his
employment). But see Weinstein v. Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that the academic tradition since copyright law began is to vest
ownership of the copyright in the faculty member).
78 Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969)
(decided on the basis of state common law copyright before the enactment of the
present Copyright Act).79 1d. at 727. The court found that "no divesting publication occurs unless there
is distribution of tangible copies of the work.., and where nothing tangible was
delivered to the students ... the giving of a lecture did not constitute a general
publication." Id.
so Weinstein v. Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). The underlying action
in the case was that a dismissed probationary faculty member at a state
university brought a civil rights action against the university and its trustees and
employees for violation of several property rights. Id. at 1092.
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than first. The Circuit Court sided with the professor, but only on
the question of whether a federal copyright was owned by the
faculty co-authors or by the university. 81  At issue were the
institutional policies of the University of Illinois, enumerated in the
faculty employment contract, which permit professors to retain
copyright except in three specified circumstances.8 2  The court
decided to construe these limitations narrowly, rather than reach a
result at odds with the strong "academic tradition" of faculty
ownership of faculty-authored works. While not purporting to
construe the "work for hire" provision of the Copyright Act, the
court did suggest that the statutory language was sufficiently broad
to "make every academic article a work for hire' and therefore vest
exclusive control in universities rather than scholars."
8 3
The custom that professors retain copyright to their work is
probably the major reason few cases have been brought before the
courts. "Academic authors have traditionally asserted the right to
publish freely their scholarly creations, and otherwise to derive the
professional fruits of their dissemination."85  For example, both
the Williams and Weinstein courts granted the professors copyright
ownership while noting that the relationship between professors
s1 Id at 1095 (holding, inter alia, that although faculty members' article was
not "work for hire" that was property of the university, the complainant's
colleague who had jointly authored the article was its co-owner and could
publish it in revised form with his name listed first, and neither the colleague nor
the university had deprived the faculty member of property in violation of due
process).82 Id at 1094. The University of Illinois had adopted a policy defining "works
for hire" which allows professors to retain the copyright unless the work falls
into one of three categories: (1) a third party agreement with the University
requires the University "to hold or transfer ownership in the copyrightable
work;" (2) works "expressly" commissioned by the University; (3) "works
created as a specific requirement of employment or as an assigned University
duty" where the duty may be contained in a job description or employment
agreement Id
83 Id at 1093-1094 (noting that copyright law at 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) gives an
employer the full rights in an employee's "work for hire" unless a contract
provides otherwise).
" See Salomon supra note 73.
85 Robert A. Gorman, Copyright and the Professoriate: A Primer and Some
Recent Developments, Academe 32 (September 1987) reprinted in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ACADEME: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM, EDWARD 0.
ANSELL ED., National Association of College and University Attorneys (1991).
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and their institutional employers is different from that of
employees in other settings. As a result of law and custom, faculty
members and universities alike have traditionally assumed that
faculty members owned the copyrights to their scholarly work.
The Scope of Employment
Under most strict interpretations of the laws (labor laws, social
security provisions, copyright law, etc.), the professor is an
"employee" of the institution. The more debatable issue is whether
the typical scholarly product is prepared "within the scope of his or
her employment" as intended under the Copyright Act, since the
Act does not define these terms. In Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, the Court applied agency law to the Copyright
Act.86 The scope of employment under the Act has been defined
as: "those acts which are so closely connected with what the
servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental
to it, that they may be regarded as methods.., of carrying out the
objectives of the employment." 87 Other factors cited by the court
include whether: "(1) it is the kind of work the person is employed
to perform; (2) the work occurs substantially within the work
hours; (3) the work is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the employer."8 8 While most academicians would argue that
the norms of academic culture presuppose a professional, non-
employee status, "the major factor in determining whether a work
is for hire is whether the employer had the right, whether or not
exercised, to supervise and control the putative employee."
89
86 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1985)
(construing agency principles as applicable in determining employment status
and whether the disputed work is within scope of employment). See also supra
text accompanying notes 63-66.
87 Vanderhurst at 1307 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, §§ 228-229;
see also United States v. Smith, 810 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1987).
8 8 Id. at 1307 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, § 228; and NIMMER, I
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 5-33 (1997)).
89 NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 5.03[B] (1997); Donaldson Publishing
Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting
that "an essential element of the employer-employee relationship, the right of
the employer 'to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs
his work"' was lacking. "This lack of control ... over performance," as well as
other factors identified by the court, "indicated that [writer] was not an
1000 [Vol 16
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The explicit and implicit agreements in the typical faculty
employment agreement support the idea that scholarly writing is
within the scope of employment as anticipated by the statute. o
Compensation packages for faculty members generally assume
some scholarly enterprise. Faculty members are expected to
produce teaching materials, books, and other icademic materials
"fixed in a tangible medium of expression" as a precondition of
tenure in most institutions. The work that faculty members
produce will normally fall "within the scope" of the courses they
teach and the field of study they have been hired to pursue. Many
faculty agreements identify other aspects of faculty employment,
such as availability of secretarial and computer resources, and
library support, that are to be provided by the university to
facilitate scholarly productivity. By all the usual standards of the
commercial world, the scholarly activities of faculty could be said
to lie directly within the scope of their employment.9' It appears
that "scholarly production" of articles, books, and other creations
are works "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment"9 and that the courts would reject the contention that
these works are not prepared "within the scope" of employment.93
'employee' in the substantial sense required by the Copyright Act"); Clarkstown
v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a volunteer
worker may be considered an employee for purposes of the copyright laws and
that the crucial factor to be considered is whether the alleged employer has the
right to direct and supervise the work of a volunteer).
I Often in materials used to nominate faculty members for promotion or in
annual evaluation materials, there are forms included which require that faculty
members list their activities that support the institutional missions. For example,
in addition to time spent in "instruction for credit," faculty may be asked to
indicate the time spent in continuing education; research, creative and
professional activities; and professional community/public service. The clear
inference is that a faculty member's scope of employment may entail these
activities.
91 See generally Gorman, supra note 84; also see Simon, supra note 68; also
see duBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. OF THE
COPYRIGHT SOC. 17 (1984). But see COMMnirEE R ON GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, REPORT ON
DISTANCE LEARNING (November 1997).
92 Simon supra note 68 at 486.
1 See Hays v. Sony Corp of America, 847 F.2d 412, 416 (comparing the
"work made for hire" concept with the "teacher exception" presumed to exist
under the 1909 Act).
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Still, arguments against treating faculty members' scholarly
products as "works for hire" are compelling. While some writings
are mandated--tests, written reports of committees, general
correspondence--more often, faculty members' agendae are
personally formulated, without external direction, to write and
conduct research on subjects of their own choosing. Faculty
members assume the editorial and publication responsibilities for
their creations, assign "their" copyright to the professional journals
which publish their works, 94 and receive whatever royalties are
paid.95 If these products were considered to be the property of the
universities, professors "publishing" teaching materials while at
one college would not be able to use them at another without the
express permission of the former institution. The copyright owner,
the employer, "could control whether and where a work was
published, how and if that work would be revised in later editions,"
and the nature of any derivative works to be developed.
96
At research universities, where the mission is to create new
knowledge, protocols have been developed for sharing the benefits
and remuneration that have been generated from faculty
inventions. Indeed, the basic research for such items as the
facsimile machine and the development of ceramic tiles used on
space shuttles have been conducted on university campuses in the
United States. If the flexibility that has developed in the
application of statutory protections for patents is assumed to flow
to the application of copyright law to university faculty members'
work, it is much easier to project the university's right to the
copyright.
Indeed, notwithstanding the few cases that have been heard, the
Copyright Act is less than supportive of the proposition of faculty
copyright ownership. The section of the Copyright Act of 1909
omitted from the Copyright Act of 1976 serves to undermine the
arguments that placed scholarly writing outside the definition of
94 See specifically Weinstein supra note 79 at 1095. Generally, scholarly
journals require assignments of copyrights by the faculty member or named
author rather than requiring assignment by the university or its representative,
but see infra n. 176 and accompanying text.
95 Contrast this treatment of royalty payments with the treatment of royalty
payments for patented works.
96 Gormnan supra note 84 at 31.
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"works made for hire."97 The revisions to the Act strengthen the
common law presumption that employers own the copyright to the
work of employees by requiring a signed writing to rebut the
presumption of ownership in the employer.98 A faculty member's
ability to rebut the presumption of university ownership will
depend, therefore, upon how explicit the language of the
employment contract or agreement is and whether both parties sign
it. Few professors take specific legal action to retain the right to
the copyright in their scholarly writings.99 Instead, many faculty
members rely on the historical laissez-faire approach of
universities to enforcement of their copyrights or to the actual
acquiescence of many universities in allowing what has been an
economically insignificant right to be retained by the faculty
member. Additionally, federal copyright law preempts state
common law copyright for most purposes, 00 undermining the
precedential value of the few common law cases on point '01and
leaving the apparent conflict between Vanderhurst and Weinstein
to be settled by the federal courts.
10 2
97 17 U.S.C. § 201.
98 Id at § 201(b) (stating specifically that "in the case of a work made for hire,
the employer ... is considered the author ... unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them ....").
9 Simon supra n. 68 at 506. See also Robert A. Gorman, Intellectual
Property: The Rights of Faculty as Creators and Users, AAUP Homepage
(visited March 6, 1999) www.aaup.org.
'00 17 U.S.C. § 301. This section prescribes three conditions, all of which
must be met, for a state law to be preempted. First the state right in question
must be "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified in section 106," second, the right must be in a work of
authorship that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Third, the work of
authorship must come within "the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103."
101 Before 1976, United States' copyright law was divided between federal and
state protection. Published works were protected by the federal copyright law,
while unpublished works were generally protected by state common law. The
common law strictly prohibited the fair use of unpublished works under the
theory that the author should decide when and in what form his work should first
reach the public.
102 Vanderhurst at 1308 (holding that professor's creation of an outline, even
though prepared on his own time, connected directly with the work for which he
was employed to do and was fairly and reasonably incidental to his
employment) and Weinstein supra n. 44 at 1094 (holding that the academic
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DISTANCE LEARNING, COPYRIGHT, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
As distance education programs have evolved, non-traditional
arrangements for course delivery have emerged. For example,
Western Governors University (WGU) was founded in 1996 by a
group including the governors of 17 states and a number of
corporate partners, including Cisco, IBM, AT&T, and KPMG.0 3
The academic plan for WGU does not include the employment of a
full-time teaching faculty nor does it provide for the internal
creation of its own courses. 10 4 Instead, WGU's "on line academic
content will come from a range of qualifying providers (colleges or
universities, or businesses, here or abroad) and all degrees will be
competency based."'0 )5 In this academic and business partnership,
therefore, the distance learning concept has shifted focus from the
educator to the content provider, where the educator becomes a
facilitator while the distance learning organization dictates and
provides course content developed by other experts in a particular
field."0 6  As additional configurations and partnerships are
developed, with neither a common practice for who delivers course
content nor for how it is delivered, the application of copyright,
because it is fact specific, will require more negotiation,
arbitration, and litigation. Of special importance in the matter of
faculty ownership of intellectual property, particularly in the arena
tradition since copyright law began is to vest ownership of the copyright in the
faculty member).
103 Ted Marchese, "Not So Distant Competitors: How New Providers Are
Remaking the Postsecondary Marketplace, " AAHE Bulletin, May 1998 at 3.104 Id.
05Id. WGU's aim is to be the broker of choice within an academic common
market that it helps create--its business plan envisions 95,000 students just after
the year 2000. Id.
106 Anne C. Keays and Andrew J. Warren, Is Distance Learning Bill
Balanced? The National Law Journal, Monday, October 26, 1998 at B5. For
example, one approach is that the educator/facilitator, "instead of using a
traditional textbook, directs the students in practical applications and exercises
via workbooks or interactive software. Therefore, rather than purchase a copy of
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of distance learning, is the notion of academic freedom and the
nature of creative and independent inquiry in the academy.
Exemptions
Under the Copyright Act, a limited exemptiondfrom infringement
of copyright is provided for performance by other than the owner
of copyrighted material in a limited distance learning situation.
10 7
The exemption is restricted to classrooms, individuals prevented
from attending class in person, and government employees as part
of their official duties. 08 In an effort to provide additional
guidelines to the educational community, and to broaden the
existing copyright exemption to include distance learning
transmissions generally, Congress passed several amendments to
the Copyright Act.10 9  These revisions expand the existing
exemption for transmitted works and permit performance, display,
107 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2) allows for the performance of nondramatic literary or
musical works by transmission without constituting infringement. To qualify for
the exemption, the performance must be part of systematic instructional
activities by a government body or non-profit educational institution, and the
performance must be directly related and of material assistance to the teaching
content of the transmission. Section 202 (a) of Title II of Public Lav No. 105-
298, the 'Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998,' adds a new set of
exemptions to section 110 (5)'s exemption from the public performance and
display rights. New sub-paragraph (B) will exempt an establishment's
communication of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or
display of a nondramatic musical work under criteria that vary with the
establishment's status as a 'food service or drinking establishment.' In the case
of an establishment that is a 'food service or drinking establishment,' sub-
paragraph (B) (ii) categorically exempts performance in spaces of less than
3,750 square feet, and also exempts performances in establishments of 3,750
square feet or more so long as a prescribed number of loudspeakers (in the case
of audio performances) or a prescribed number of audiovisual devices (in the
case of audiovisual performances) is not exceeded. Sub-paragraph B (I)
prescnibes the same formula for all other (non-food or drinking) establishments,
but employs 2,000 square feet as the tipping point for application of the audio
and audiovisual device ceiling. As a further condition to both categories, no
direct charge can be made to see or hear the transmission, the transmission
cannot be further transmitted beyond the establishment, and the original
transmission had to have been licensed by the copyright owner.
'0" 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2).
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or distribution of any copyrighted works by analog or digital
transmission for distance learning."10 The amendments also add the
exemption to transmissions to students enrolled in distance
learning courses and to government employees receiving distance
learning within their employment, thereby eliminating the existing
requirement for reception in classrooms."' Since the exemption is
limited to only certain types of copyrighted material, however, it
may not cover the multimedia distance learning products available
today. The exemption, for example, does not appear to apply to
courses that are delivered directly to a student's home via the
Internet. 112
Fair Use
The judicial doctrine of fair use, which has been loosely codified
under the Copyright Act, section 107, is a means of permitting,
under certain conditions, the limited use of copyrighted materials
without the owner's consent. The impact of the fair use doctrine is
to justify some uses that would otherwise be copyright
infringements. 113 As an equitable rule, it has been applied with a
considerable degree of flexibility. Although the statute does not
define fair use, it identifies a variety of factors that are relevant in
determining whether the doctrine applies in a particular case. 
1'4
The purpose of the doctrine is to balance the public's interest in the
free flow of ideas and information against the copyright owner's
right to the exclusive use and control of the work.
The "fair use" exemption that educators enjoy permits a limited
amount of copying and distribution of copyrighted printed material
for educational purposes.1 5 Most educational institutions have
widely disseminated policies articulating their application of the
fair use exemption. These fair use policies generally refer to
110 Id.
111 Id.
113 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, I NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1997).
114 17 U.S.C. § 107. These factors include: 1) the purpose and character of the
use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 4) the effect
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photocopying of copyrighted materials and do not reference the
development of copyrightable materials. Distance learning
educators, however, find it difficult to apply even these limited
regulations to content delivered in electronic form, most likely
because policies applicable to paper copies are not easily
transferable to electronic copies.
Licensing
Some universities make their distance learning courses available
under the terms and conditions of non-negotiable click wrap
licenses" 6 or other similar types of licenses."' Currently, distance
learning providers offer access and use rights under several
different licensing options, including site, user, seat, library, or
enterprises licenses. Distance learning licensing concepts were
most easily adapted from the software industry because the
products combine educational content, video, entertainment
components, software, and other multimedia technology." 8 It
appears, however, that universities have adapted licensing
agreements from the software industry practice of providing access
to, and use of, electronic information to educational institutions
and corporations and have assumed the ownership of the licenses
without significant consideration given to the faculty member's
potential property rights.
Similar to licenses for computer software, the licenses of
distance-learning products provide the student or recipient with a
limited right to access and use of the course information. Such
licenses do not necessarily accommodate a clear definition of the
applicability of the doctrine of fair use from the perspective of the
traditional classroom educator. In general, distance learning
service providers and product developers have not yet created a
licensing protocol to balance the student's need for receiving
content with the rights of the product's copyright owner.
116 Click wrap licenses are so named because the licensee is generally required
to "click" the computer's mouse to acknowledge having read the license and
having accepted the terms and conditions of the license agreement.
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Particularly important is the anomaly created by proposed
changes to Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, one of which
would preempt enforcement of non-negotiable licenses.1
9
Specifically, a work distributed to the public under a non-
negotiable (i.e., clickwrap) license, would not be protected under
state common law or statutory provisions to the same extent as
non-publicly distributed works. 20 Therefore, if the clickwrap
license contained provisions that "limited the reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, performance or display, by means of
transmission, or otherwise, of copyrighted works," the license
would not be enforceable.12 ' As a result, the licensee would obtain
much broader rights than those granted by the license. The net
result is that the interpretation and applicability of the license terms
depends on the manner in which the product is distributed. Given
the rapid rate of change in the information distribution system, this
legislation, if enacted, may quickly become obsolete. 1
22
Current Legislation
When advances in the development of motion picture technology
affected the application of the Copyright Act of 1909 to the
development of aural and visual recordings, Congress faced
challenges similar to those of distance education, even though
those challenges were brought about by different technological
changes.' 23  To address these technological advances, a
comprehensive project to review and revise the copyright law was
authorized by Congress in 1955124 During the revision process, a
National Commission of New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) was established to study changes in technology
19 1d
120 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining publication as "the distribution of copies... of a
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending. The offering to distribute copies.., to a group of persons for purposes
of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes
publication.").
121 See Keays supra n. 106 at B10.
122 id
'23See NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 2.03 [D]; 13.03 [A] [1] (1997).
124 See Wadley supra note 50 at 10.
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and to recommend to Congress specific provisions to address those
developments.125
As originally adopted, the 1976 Act did not expressly list
computer programs as works of authorship. The CONTU Final
Report, however, recommended amendments to the 1976 Act and
provided for the inclusion of computer progranis in the statute. 26
In the 1980 revisions of the Act, Section 101 was rewritten to
include a definition of "computer program" and Section 117 was
revised to specify the limitations on exclusive rights in the case of
computer programs. 2 7 The ability to copyright computer programs
has, subsequently, been upheld by the courts. 128 The problem
remains, however, that ideas are not protected. 2 9 Therefore, except
to the extent that a computer program has an identity separate and
apart from the idea(s) which it implements, protection will be
denied.
130
In the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 3 1 Congress
directed the federal Copyright Office 132 to consult with content
' Pub. L. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-75 (1974) established CONTU.
126 United States, National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrightable Works, Final Report, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
1979.
127 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines computer program as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." In addition, § 117 specifies the limitations on exclusive
rights in the case of computer programs. Id
128 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d. 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (holding that a computer
program, so long as it is original and sufficiently expressive, will be
copyrightable whether it is expressed in words, in a flow chart, in source code or
object code, and whether it is embodied in paper, magnetic disk, tape or
semiconductor chip).
129 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b). See supra text accompanying note 41.
o30 See NaiMER, 1 NIMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 2.03 [D]; 13.03 (A] [1] (1997)
and cases cited therein.
131 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
§ 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860,2877-83 (1998) ("DMCA"). Enactment of the DMCA
was the result of a multi-year effort to clarify the responsibilities of Internet
service providers (ISPs) for the copyright infringing activities of their
subscribers. Educational institutions that provide Internet and on-line access to
their students, faculty, and staff are classified as ISPs, along with other
commercial service providers. The DMCA also implements the 1996 World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright and Performances and
Phonograms Treaties through provisions securing technological protection
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providers, eleemosynary educational institutions, and non- profit
libraries and make recommendations to Congress within six
months of the exemptions to the exclusive rights of copyright
owners that are needed to promote distance education, while
maintaining an appropriate balance between all parties in the
industry. 133 The Register of Copyrights was directed to consider a
number of factors in this report: (1) the need for an exemption for
distance education through digital networks; (2) categories of
works to be included; (3) whether there should be quantitative
limitations on how much of a work can be used; (4) whether only
nonprofit educational institutions or all distance education
providers should benefit from the exemption; (5) whether reception
of the transmission of distance education materials under the
exemption should be restricted to students enrolled in the course;
(6) whether technological measures are available to prevent
unauthorized access; (7) the extent to which the availability of
licenses should be considered in assessing eligibility for any
exemption; and (8) any other factors.1
34
measures and electronic rights management; creates safe harbors for online
service providers; exempts temporary copies of computer programs made in the
course of computer maintenance; amends digital performance rights; and creates
a new form of industrial design protection for boat hulls. Title II of the DMCA
creates new § 512 of the Copyright Act which provides a limited immunity for
ISPs if certain conditions are met. Additionally, § 512( e) incorporates a special
rule limiting the liability for non-profit educational institutions for the activities
of faculty members and graduate student employees who are "performing a
teaching or research function." The conditions attached to this special protection
are that (1) the faculty member or graduate student employee's infringing
activities do not involve providing on-line access to instructional materials
required or recommended for a course taught at the institution by the employee
within the preceding three years (i.e., the work must be fresh); (2) the institution,
within the preceding three years, received no more than two notifications of
claimed infringement by the employee; and, 3) the institution provides all users
with information describing and promoting compliance with copyright. Id.
132 Id. at Title II.
"' S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1 (1998). The Committee Report describes the
purpose of Title IV of the Act as intended to initiate updates to the nation's
copyright laws with respect to library, archive, and educational uses of
copyrighted works in the digital age.
134 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
§ 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-83 (1998).
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The resulting Report on Copyright and Digital Distance
Education135  contains numerous recommendations that, if
translated into legislation, will influence college and university
policies pertaining to distance learning. The report recommended
that the categories of works included in the exemption be expanded
to include dramatic, literary, musical, and audiovisual works. At
the same time, it suggests that the restriction on the place of
instruction be removed but that the current language limiting the
exemption to nonprofit educational institutions and government
bodies be retained. It proposes expanding the coverage of rights to
meet technological necessities so that digital copies made
incidental to a transmission are not viewed as infringing copies.
Of particular interest is the recommendation that when the
performance of the work is integral to the instruction, or when the
instructor is illustrating a point, the performance may be exempted
from copyright infringement. The report also proposes that
educational institutions become responsible to "apply measures to
protect against unauthorized access; provide protection against
unauthorized dissemination after access has been acquired; use
only lawfully acquired copies of copyrighted works that are
performed or displayed; and educate the campus community about
copyright."'
136
The Evolution of Copyright Ownership in the University
Writing on the topic of patent law in higher education, Kaplin
and Lee, prominent higher education legal commentators, stated:
[t]he question of who owns a particular discovery, invention,
or design is especially complicated in higher education
institutions because of the faculty's academic freedom
interests; the institution's interest in obtaining a return on its
investments in researchers, facilities, and equipment; and the
135 U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Copyright and Digital Distance
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funding source's potential interest in the commercial
application of the fruits of its investment.
137
As colleges and universities move more fully into the commercial
approach of content delivery via distance learning technology, the
complicated question of ownership raised in the context of
inventions and discoveries becomes equally significant to the
issues of copyright ownership.1
38
As noted earlier, the case law involving challenges to copyright
ownership in a college or university setting is sparse. User rights in
higher education have been clarified instead through unilateral
institutional policy statements, private agreements, and negotiated
settlements. Such approaches, however, do not create law, and
they are binding only on the immediate parties. These individual
actions and their overall course of dealings form what some
education attorneys have called a "campus common law." 139
Relationship to Distance Learning
Additionally, the institution may obtain copyright ownership by
virtue of a written assignment in the same way that most
universities acquire patent ownership. 140 Such an assignment must
explicitly cover copyrighted works and must be signed by the
author. 141  In such cases, the individual assignor--not the
institution-- is deemed the author so that the term of the copyright
is the life of the author plus 70 years. 142 If the university chooses to
137 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN AND BARBARA LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
3D ED., Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995 at 355.
138 The patent analogy may be the most appropriate because copyright and
patent have a common constitutional source in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
139 KAPLIN AND LEE, supra note 137 at 17.
140 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d) stating in pertinent part: "(1) The ownership of a
copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or
operation of law . . .. (2) [a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright... may be transferred as provided in clause (1) and owned separately.
141 Id. at § 204 (a) stating in pertinent part: "A transfer of copyright ownership,
other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of
conveyance... is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or
such owner's duly authorized agent.
142 Title I of Public Law No. 105-298, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act (signed into law on October 27,1998), effectively extended the
term of all subsisting and future copyrights by twenty years.
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use the formality of an assignment process as a requisite for
employment of the faculty member, other issues may emerge
regarding the freedom with which the assignment of the faculty
member's putative property rights is given.'43
Just as software produced in an academic setting usually
involves several participants with differing ioles, so does the
development of distance learning courses. A faculty member may
conceive the outline for the course products while staff members
with audiovisual and production experience may create the "fixed"
medium materials from the lectures. To ascertain whether the
institution owns the course, one must determine who could be
considered as author(s) and then which, if any, individual is
working within the scope of employment." But, just as an
individual who contributes nothing original to a software product
cannot be an author, when a faculty member implements the
specific instructions of a supervisor to produce a distance learning
course, it can be inferred that the copyright vests in the university
rather than in the faculty member.
145
Authors are not obliged by law to place a copyright notice on
their work in order to retain the copyright.' 46 A notice is therefore
not necessary when, for example, teaching materials authored by a
professor are distributed to students for classroom use, or a
1 For example, if the faculty member claims that the assignment of property
rights to the university was forced upon him, does the possibility of acquisition
of those rights by duress affect the ownership of the copyright?
1" See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text discussing work for hire and
scope of employment
145 Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (holding that a work is
prepared by an employee whenever the hiring party retains the right to control
the product); see Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(comparing the "efforts of the scribe" to the "genesis of the ideas" and holding
that a work is prepared by an employee under § 101 (1) when the hiring party
has actually wielded control with respect to the creation of a particular work).
'46 17 U.S.C. at § 401 states in pertinent part:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright
owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section shall
be placed on all publicly distributed copies from which the
work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.
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manuscript or an article is submitted to one or a number ofjournals
for consideration.147 Copyright owners still have good reason to
affix copyright notice to copies of their works, because there are
statutory requirements requiring notice'48 and registration'49 of the
copyright in order to bring a suit for infringement 5 ' and be eligible
for an award of damages.' If the university asserts or attempts
"4 Most professional journals require the faculty member to attest that the
submission is the original work of the faculty member and to release the
copyright ownership to the journal. Until recently there have been no
requirements imposed by universities that they be identified as the copyright
holder, joint author, or possessor of any other property interest in the faculty
work. See e.g., infra accompanying text at notes 184-187.
148 17 U.S.C. at § 401 (d) and 402 (d) provide as a general rule that if notice
appears on the published copy to which the infringer had access, a court shall
give no weight to a defense that innocent infringement mitigates actual or
statutory damages.
149 See 17 U.S.C. at § 405. Registration is not a condition of copyright
protection and a copyright owner may obtain registration for his work at any
time during the copyright term. The incentive to prompt registration is § 405
(a)(2) that allows registration to cure errors or omissions in copyright notice
only if "registration for the work has been made before or is made within five
years after the publication without notice." Id.
s0 Id. at § 405 (a). This section provides that the omission of notice from
copies of a protected work may be excused or cured under certain
circumstances, in which case the copyright is valid from the moment the work
was created, just as if no omission had occurred. Id. The House Report
accompanying the act stated with respect to § 405(a) that
under the general scheme of the bill, statutory copyright
protection is secured automatically when a work is created,
and is not lost when the work is published, even if the
copyright notice is omitted entirely .... [U]nder the proposed
law a work that is published without any copyright notice will
still be subject to statutory protection for at least five years,
whether the omission was partial or total, unintentional or
deliberate.
H. Rep. No. 1476, 94'h Cong., 2d Sess. 147.
' 17 U.S.C. at § 411 requires copyright owners of works originating in the
U.S. to obtain registration in order to file a copyright infringement action and
§ 412 provides that no award of statutory damages or attorney's fees can be
made for
(1)any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work
commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2)
any infringement of copyright commenced after first
publication of the work and before the effective date of its
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34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 3, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss3/17
DISTANCE EL) UCATION
to assert an ownership interest in the work of its faculty members
under the "work for hire" doctrine, then an additional, complex
question relating to distance learning may arise in the context of
derivative works.'5
In Weismann v. Freeman, 15 3 Dr. Leonard Freeman, a medical
school professor, was sued by Dr. Heidi Weiimann, his former
research assistant, who was also a physician."s  Freeman and
Weismann were prolific authors who, in addition to their
individual articles, had co-authored numerous previous works in
the field of nuclear medicine." One of the papers they co-
authored in 1980 was a review of techniques in an area of
"radionuclide imaging."156 They cooperated in a series of revisions
to that article over the next five years, but then Weismann
published under her own name an article derived from the previous
works they had written jointly."s Two years later Freeman gave a
lecture and, in developing supporting materials for the lecture,
prepared to disseminate Weismann's article by removing her
name, substituting his own, and modifying the title by three
words.158 Weismann complained and, although Freeman never
registration, unless such registration is made within three
months after the first publication of the work.
Mii
152 17 U.S.C. at § 101 defines a derivative work as
[a] work based upon one or more pre-existing works such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.'
Id
1 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
tId. at 1315.
155 Id.
1161L at 13 15-16.
1 Id at 1316. Portions of Freeman's paper were taken verbatim from the
previously co-authored documents, with substantial new elements added solely
by Weismann. Id.15S id/
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distributed the revised version, Weismann brought a copyright
infringement action.
Freeman contended that he was entitled to recognition as co-
author of the work in question because the material was based on
other materials they had co-authored. The lower court held that,
under the copyright act, the doctors were joint authors of the new
work because there was insufficient new material for the document
to be protected as a derivative work.'59 Weismann, however,
argued that the document in question contained significant new
material that she had developed and authored, and therefore that
the work was solely hers for copyright purposes.'
60
Joint Authorship
The Second Circuit Court ruled that joint authorship in prior
existing materials with Weismann did not make Freeman a joint
author in a derivative work, 16' holding that "when the work has
been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a
separate work." 162 The court interpreted Section 103 (b) as giving
copyright protection to new portions of the derivative work but not
to preexisting portions. 63 In this case, the parties collaborated in
the preparation and publication of previous documents from which
the work in question was derived. The court, however, found no
evidence that they intended to create a joint derivative product.
164
159 The protection of derivative rights extends beyond mere protection against
unauthorized copying to include the right to make other versions of, perform, or
exhibit the work.
'" Weismann, 868 F.2d at 1316.
161 Id. at 1319. The court held that "[E]ven though one co-author has the right
to revise a joint work in order to create an individual derivative work, the other
co-author acquires no property rights in the newly created work prepared
without his involvement" (citing Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning and
Control, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329, 1338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) for the proposition
that even sole author/owner of pre-existing material contained in derivative
work has no property right in new matter created for the derivative work added
without his participation).
162 Weismann, 868 F.2d at 1317.
161Id at 1319.
164 Id. The court cited Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.1944) (L. Hand, J.) (observing that a finding of joint
authorship requires that each author intend his or her contribution, at the time
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Instead, the court focused on the requirement that joint authors
must intend to make their joint product "forever indivisible" and
that Weismann and Freeman were scientists in a "quest of new
discoveries."'6' The court was clear that absent a specifically
identified exception, "joint ownership of the underlying work does
not confer any property right in the new work" except those rights
"retained in the material used as part of the compilation of the
derivative work."" The court enunciated the originality
requirement for a revised version to qualify for protection as a
derivative work as a "minimal" or "modest" one.1
67
Fair Use
The lower court had also found that even if the project were a
protected derivative work,"6 Weismann's use of the materials
would have constituted fair use under Section 107269 The court
conducted an extensive review of the fair use doctrine, beginning
with a review of the underlying equities, 170 and noted specifically
that it is created, to become part of a unitary work to which another will make or
already has made a contribution). See also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., ("Melancholy Baby "), 161 F.2d 406,409 (2d Cir. 1946).
165 Weismann, 868 F. 2d at 1319.
166 Id
167 868 F.2d at 1321. The court applied the standard enunciated in Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102,103 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding
that "[a]l that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that
the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation,
something recognizably 'his own"'). See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee
Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 35 (2d Cir. 1982); Puddu v. Buonamici
Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1971); Millworth Converting Corp. v.
Slifka, 276 F.2d 443,445 (2d Cir. 1960).
'66 See 17 U.S.C. § 101, supra note 144 and accompanying text. To constitute
infiingement, a "derivative work" must be "based on the copyrighted work" and
must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form. Id
169 17 U.S.C§ 107 codifies the "fair use" doctrine by creating a privilege for
people to use copyrighted material in a reasonable manner despite lacking the
owner's consent.
170 Weismann, 868 F. 2d at 1323 (citing Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 508 (2d Cir. 1984) ("fair use requires
'sensitive balancing of interests,' and the statutory factors are not hurdles over
which an infringer may leap safely from liability"). See also Sony Corporation
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that Freeman "not only neglected to credit [Weismann] for her
authorship... but actually attempted to pass off the work as his
own, substituting his name as author in place of hers."7 1 The court
noted that Section 107 codifies the so-called "fair use" doctrine
and "creates a privilege for others to use copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner despite the lack of the owner's consent." 172 The
four statutory factors considered in making a fair use determination
are:
[t]he purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.173
These nonexclusive factors exist to serve as a guide in the
consideration of fair use. 174 Each case must be individually
examined to determine the applicability of the fair use doctrine.M
5
To find that an author used another's copyrighted material in a fair
of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984), where the
Supreme Court noted that the doctrine requires an "equitable rule of reason"
analysis to assess the extent of protection from liability an alleged infringer may
be able to show. Id.
171 Weismann at 1323.
172 d See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
'73 Weismann at 1323.
174 See also The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) Draft on Fair Use
Guidelines, 53 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 125, 130 (December
19, 1996).
175 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994);
Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enterprise, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). Fair
use is an affirmative defense and as such is relevant only after a copyright owner
has made out a prima facie case of infringement, consisting of ownership of the
right asserted and unauthorized appropriation by the defendant of a material
amount of expression. The copying of facts or of a de minimis amount of
expression will not support a prima facie case of infringement. Fair use thus
excuses the copying of a material amount of expression, with the test of
materiality involving both quantitative and qualitative inquiries. Id.
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manner requires a finding that the user acted fairly and in good
faith.'
76
In explicating each of the "fair use" factors, the court found that
"in an academic setting, profit is ill-measured in dollars" and that
recognition is valuable because of the role it plays in tenure
decisions and promotions."7 In addition, since Freeman's intended
use was substantially the same as Weismann's, the equity balanced
in Weismann's favor for the first prong. Further, the fact that
Freeman substantially copied Weismann's work and "whatever the
use, generally it may not constitute a fair use if the entire work is
reproduced," ' lends itself to the conclusion that Freeman's use
was not fair. The court also found under the "effect on the market"
factor that there was substantial impairment of Weismann's ability
to use her publication to enhance her standing in the research
community. Due to the requirements in academia that a researcher
be productive, the court found that it was a significant error to find
"fairness" in Freeman's use.
In Weismann, the university did not intervene to assert any
copyright privilege. The court proceeded on the assumption that
the issue of copyright was solely between Weismann and Freeman
and that future derivative works would only be of interest to these
two parties. However, in situations where the university claims
ownership of the copyright to distance learning materials created
under its aegis, questions will arise as to the rights of faculty
creators in subsequent "fair use" of the materials which they
originally delivered via distance learning media. The faculty
member must first show that the copyright is at least jointly owned
with the university, and then must show that the faculty member's
use is not an inappropriate infringement but is "fair use." This
showing is especially complex in the context of distance learning.
Recent court cases involving new technology may have some
general applicability to higher education. In Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, fair use doctrine was extended to home
176 Weismann at 1323-24. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th
Cir.1983); see also Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 503
F. Supp. 1137, 1146 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (good faith and fair dealing required).
177 Weismann at 1324.
178 ld at 1325 (quoting 3 NIMMER § 13.05 [A] at 13-80).
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recordings of television broadcasts for later use. 79 'While the
narrow holding in Sony may serve individual research needs, it did
not overturn a lower court's previous ruling in Encyclopaedia
Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks that schools cannot record
broadcasts for long-term retention or for showings to
classrooms.'8 An extension of the Crooks ruling would appear to
favor universities in maintaining their copyrights in distance
learning courses that are developed through institutionally
provided technological resources and offered to those who are
enrolled at some site other than the campus. In addition, the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union may very well signal a more enlightened view by the courts
in analyzing the rights of all persons as they use new technology
for traditional business purposes.' 8 ' The key to the Reno decision,
and to its future significance, seems to rest in the Court's
recognition of the Internet as a "new marketplace of ideas" and a
"vast democratic forum."' 8 2 The Internet may open an opportunity
for universities to develop an "academic marketplace of ideas"
with new approaches to the use and availability of educational
resources without the risk of significant government interference.
As the Reno Court stated,
[F]rom the publishers' point of view, [the
Internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to
address and hear from a world-wide audience of
millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers. Any person or organization with a
computer connected to the Internet can 'publish'
179 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
454-455 (1984). In Sony, owners of copyrights on television programs brought
copyright infringement action against manufacturers of home videotape
recorders. The court held that "the public interest in making television
broadcasting more available.., is not unlimited." The court supported an
interpretation of the concept of "fair use" that "requires the copyright holder to
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn a private act of
time-shifting as a violation of federal law." Id.
"'0 Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247,
1250-51, 54, 55 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
18' Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). At issue was
the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from
"indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet. Id.
112 ld. at 885.
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information. Publishers include government
agencies, educational institutions, commercial
entities, advocacy groups, and individuals.
Publishers may either make their material available
to the entire pool of Internet users, or confine access
to a selected group, such as those willing to pay for
the privilege.
83
By identifying the right of publishers to limit access to materials
through payment of a fee for use, the Court indirectly opened the
door to an increased use of licensing and license fees for materials
made available through new technological media. In addition, by
acknowledging educational institutions as publishers on the
Internet, the Court, also indirectly, contributed to the discussion of
the ownership of copyright in materials disseminated through
distance learning modes.
In Fall 1998, the provost at the California Institute of
Technology (CalTech) took the issue public by proposing that
CalTech and its professors would retain the copyrights to articles
that resulted from campus-based research, would not sign those
rights over to publishers, and would only allow journals to publish
manuscripts by CalTech researchers if the faculty and the
university retained copyrights to the material. 184 Asserting that the
institution and its faculty members should jointly own and retain"8
rights to journal articles and license those copyrights to publishers
on a limited basis, 186the provost argued that rather than bending to
the demands of publishers, CalTech faculty could publish directly
on-line while maintaining the copyright to their articles.187 Thus far,
however, the provost has not gone so far as to attempt to retain for
the University exclusively, without consideration of the faculty, the
'83ld at 853.
'84Laura Guernsey, "A Provost Challenges His Faculty to Keep Copyright on
Journal Articles," The Chronicle of Higher Education (Sept.18, 1998) as
reported at http:lchronicle.comlfreev45/i04/ 04a02901.htm, (visited Sept. 14,
1998).
18 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a "joint work" as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or






Le Moal-Gray: Distance Education and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Co
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
1022 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 16
copyright to faculty members' articles.188While CalTech may be
unique in its approach, various institutions have published
copyright policies which attempt to restrict copyright ownership




189 See, e.g., University of Texas, Office of General Counsel, "Crash Course In
Copyright," accessible at http:/www:utsystem.edulOGCIntellectual Property?
cprindx.html. This is the website for the University of Texas higher education
system. A segment of the published "Policy and Guidelines for Management
and Marketing of Copyrighted Works" states:
[i]f component institutions invest in copyright works that the
authors will own under the U.T. System Intellectual Property
Policy, they must protect their investments and, with the
authors, manage such author-owned copyrights to facilitate
institutional access to the works and preserve rights to make
nonprofit educational uses of them. The U.T. Board of
Regents (Board) finds that works protected by copyright
created at the component institutions are valuable assets that
promote and further the creation and dissemination of
knowledge through research, teaching and publication. Careful
management of these assets will benefit the authors, the
citizens of Texas, state government, the component
institutions, and the U.T. System .... For projects that may
involve significant resource contributions by the institution,
component institutions and professionals, faculty, non-faculty
researchers and students will agree to allocate rights to use the
resulting works, allocate costs and share benefits from
commercialization, as appropriate in each case.... [For]
Works authored by employees other than professionals,
faculty, non-faculty researchers and students and therefor
owned by the Board or jointly owned by the Board and other
authors, [there are] some occasions when a component
institution hires a professional, faculty member, non-faculty
researcher or student specifically to create a work that the
author would otherwise own under Subsection 2.3 of the
Intellectual Property Policy, it may be unclear that this is a
work for hire. If this is ever the case, the author should
execute an acknowledgment that the work is within the scope
of employment and that the Board will own copyright in the
work to avoid later confusion over ownership.
42
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In a joint work, the authors hold individual, undivided interests
in a work, despite differences in each author's contribution.190 As
co-owner, each author may rightfully license the use of the work,
subject to an accounting to the other co-owner(s) for any profits."
Under this approach, a person whose contribution is relatively
minor enjoys a significant benefit if granted joint authorshipstatus. 92
CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL POLICY
Legal Bases of Ovnership
When a faculty member creates course materials, copyright
attaches when the material is recorded on paper or tape, or
otherwise "fixed in a tangible medium."'" Under a constructionist
application of copyright law, colleges and universities have the
right to declare ownership of those courses and materials
developed under their auspices and preserved in a tangible fixed
medium. While the question of who owns the copyright has been
defined by different institutions in different ways,"9 if the faculty
member created the course material using university resources or
10 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-06 (2nd Cir. 1991) (holding that for
a joint authorship to exist there must be an intent of both participants to regard
themselves as authors). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOcTRINEs 635 (4th ed.1997) (stating that
"[e]ven though the 1976 act's objective, factual standard for joint authorship
may inadvertently give an economic interest in a work to contributors ... the
work's contributors can remedy this at the outset by... allocat[ing] all of the
incidents of ownership to the intended recipient").
191 Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
192 See supra text accompanying note 185. See also Erickson v. Trinity
Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying a "copyrightable" standard
to the determination of the contribution of the joint author).
193 See supra notes 37,38 and accompanying text.
194 Some institutional copyright policies are published and accessible on line.
See e.g., Carnegie Mellon University Copyright policy,
http://policy.andrew.emu.eduluniv-policy/documents(Copyrighthtml; North
Carolina State University Patent and Copyright Procedures
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as part of the faculty member's assigned responsibilities, the
argument can be made that the material was developed under the
"work made for hire" doctrine 95 and the copyright for that work
belongs to the university.
In general, universities define the employer-employee
relationship through individual employment contracts or as
codified in a faculty handbook, which is then incorporated by
reference into employment contracts. Wherever the employer-
employee relationship is defined, an institutional policy should
note that certain intellectual property is owned by the institution
(as the employer) as works developed by employees within the
scope of employment.
In some instances, current faculty contracts include statements
which parallel intellectual property law, with the appropriate
adaptations to higher education. Some institutions may opt to have
faculty sign a waiver when teaching distance learning courses to
insure that faculty understand that the course becomes the property
of the institution, irrespective of the university's intended use of
the material. Those institutions where tenured, full time faculty
(employees) teach courses through distance learning technology
should consider developing copyright agreements that model their
patent policies, similar to the technology transfer agreements that
have been developed at colleges and universities across the
country. 1
96
Colleges and universities need to consider licensing protocols
that will address how intellectual property rights are retained
and/or moved when faculty move to another institution to offer the
same course in a different distance learning setting. Institutions
must also respond proactively to the real possibility that two
institutions may become owners of similar virtual lectures. If the
original employer university retained authorship and copyright,
that original owner could negotiate a right or license to use the
material with the subsequent university employer.
Additionally, in the event that the course is created as a
collaborative effort, any agreement should define the works as
See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
'96 For examples of intellectual property and technology transfer policies from
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either a collective work, a joint work, or a work made for hire and
the agreement should state clearly the rights that each contributor
holds individually or assigns to the institution. While each
contributor to a joint work is presumed to be an equal co-owner
with full authority to dispose of the copyright (or any one or more
of the bundle of rights associated with ownership), subject only to
an accounting to the other authors for the proceeds, the university
can obviate this problem by defining its pre-eminent right to all
materials developed under its aegis.
Many universities already contract with federal agencies to
conduct research or to provide training programs. Some federal
agencies permit the author to own certain copyrights, others place
ownership with the university, some do not allow assertion of
copyright, and some contracts require assignment of the copyright
to the federal agency. Additionally, public institutions may find
that state laws control the ownership of any copyrightable
materials developed under their auspices. In any of these
situations, the university must have the right to control ownership
of the copyrightable material in order meet its obligations with the
external parties.
At a minimum, the copyright issues that should be addressed in
an institution's copyright policy pertaining to distance learning
courses or materials include definitions of the property
incorporated in the policy, the issue of copyright ownership, the
division of any profits associated with the dissemination of the
copyrighted work, and statements of who retains the rights to
modify the materials. In addition, the policy should: incorporate a
statement of future use of the materials, such as whether the faculty
member can utilize the materials to teach a course at, or through, a
different institution; identify who may create derivative works;
note whether licensing of the materials is permitted; and, include
the conditions for fair use, incorporating specified time limits on
future use of the materials.
Concerns of University Faculty Unions
With the proliferation of distance learning offerings, faculty
unions have begun to express concerns about the role of
technology in the delivery of courses and the threat to their
2000 1025
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members 197 on issues pertaining to intellectual property rights and
institutional support for new projects. 198  For example, the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has published a position
paper on the role of technology in education which opposes the use
of technology, especially in distance education. 199 While they are
not opposed specifically to the use of technology in education, the
AFT is concerned about the unplanned utilization of pedagogical
techniques that would serve to reduce the role of faculty and limit
the interaction of faculty in the education of students.
The AFT has indicated that "all of our experience as educators
tells us that teaching and learning in the shared human spaces of a
campus are essential to the undergraduate experience and cannot
be compromised too greatly without rendering the education
unacceptable." 200 Unless the classes meet the standards of quality
set by faculty, the AFT opposes courses taught on the Internet,
through videoconferencing and with other technologies. In
addition, the position paper stresses the importance of granting
course credit for only those classes that are taught in university
facilities by faculty who are appointed and evaluated according to
standard institutional practices. 0 1 The AFT also urges its members
to seek restrictions on the number of distance education credits
granted to students as part of a degree program and to oppose
curricula that are taught entirely through technological media.
20 2
Furthermore, the AFT advises its local affiliates to bargain for
contracts that will protect the jobs of professors who choose not to
use new technologies to support their instruction.
20 3
The National Education Association (NEA), another professional
organization of teachers that also serves as a bargaining
representative for college faculty members, has issued a statement
197 Peter Monaghan, "Technology and the Unions, " The Chronicle of Higher
Education, (Feb.10, 1995) at A17 (reporting on a 1995 meeting on the role of
technology on college campuses attended by 200 American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) union members in Seattle).
198 Id.
199 Goldie Blumenstyk, "Faculty Group Calls for Caution and Curbs on
Distance Education," The Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan. 26,1996) at A20.
2 0 1 id
202 id.
203 Id. See generally the AFT website at www.AFT.org.
1026 [Vol 16
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regarding intellectual property rights.2 04 The NEA, in advising its
unions to bargain for intellectual property rights, asserts "[t]he
issue is important to unions that want to protect faculty property
rights and to colleges that might 61aim ownership." 20 5 The national
policy of the NEA is that faculty must maintain control of their
own work and that it is the faculty members' prerogative to
determine how to disseminate their work.
Further, the faculty members of the NEA are concerned with
keeping distance education materials current and do not want
outdated institutional materials to become available. Therefore,
the NEA policy states that it is unacceptable for administrators to
require assignment of intellectual property rights as a condition of
employment and that issues of ownership of websites, lecture notes
on websites, and other technical concerns should be determined by
the faculty member and not imposed by the university. 20 6 The
NEA claims that "administrators and faculty members commonly,
but incorrectly, assume that the institution, as the employer, owns
the invention and that policies presuming institutional ownership
are routine and enforceable. ' 20 7 However, the NEA statement also
notes another dilemma:
If the course is broadcast or taped as part of the
faculty member's regular duties, the university may
claim ownership as the employer. On the other
hand, as the owner of the underlying notes and
materials, the faculty member may claim ownership
on the basis that the broadcast or videotape is a
derivative work.
208
204 STATEMENT OF THE NEA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, NATIONAL
EDUCATION AssOCIATION, http-//www:nea.org/cet/BRIEFSfbriefS.htnl, visited
10/27/98.
205 Id. The NEA Higher Education Contract Analysis System (HECAS)
contains more than 500 higher education contracts for faculty and staff
bargaining units, many of which contain intellectual property sections, generally
in the following areas: a) definition of the property, and the conditions under
which the institution may assert all or partial ownership; b) use of the property,
including fair use and exclusive license arrangements; c) distribution of any
monies earned, including royalties or tuition payments; d) dispute resolution
procedures, including binding arbitration.206 id.
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The NEA, however, has not yet addressed the convergence of
traditional copyright practices and the evolving issues pertaining to
the use of new instructional media. For example, the NEA does not
state that any of the work produced by a faculty member is solely
the property of that faculty member and that institutional policies
should not derogate that right. Until the NEA promulgates a more
definitive organizational standard for ownership of intellectual
property, it will continue to be difficult for local NEA leaders to
negotiate agreements that are acceptable, and favorable, to their
faculty members.
Similar to the AFT and the NEA, the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) 209 considers issues of academic
freedom related to teaching, research, and creation of materials and
control over their distribution and use, to be fundamental to the
academic profession in general. The AAUP established a
subcommittee (Committee R) that reported to the Association on
the topic of distance learning.
2 1 0
In 1969, the AAUP adopted its Statement on Instructional
Television"1 and asserted: "[t]he use of television in teaching
should be for the purpose of advancing the basic functions of
colleges and universities to preserve, augment, criticize, and
transmit knowledge and to foster the student's ability to learn.,
212
209 The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) is another
professional organization of teachers that also serves as a collective bargaining
representative for college and university faculty members. The best known
public statement of the AAUP is its 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, written "to promote public understanding and support of
academic freedom." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (1940),
accessible at www.AAUP.org/1940stat.htm.
210 COMMITTEE R ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, REPORT ON DISTANCE LEARNING (November 1997),
accessible at www.AAUP.org.
211 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON
INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION (1969).212 Id. It further stated:
A faculty member engaged in instructional television is
entitled to academic freedom as a teacher, researcher, and
citizen in accordance with the provisions of the 1940 Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. . .. Because
television production is a form of publication, a faculty
member has the same freedom to enter into an agreement with
1028 [Vol 16
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In applying the principles of the 1940 AAUP Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure" to the "new
medium" of instructional television, the 1969 Statement went on to
assert that the faculty member has the "full responsibility for
selection of materials and point of view" and that "the teacher has
the final responsibility for the content and objectives of the
program.
' 214
The 1997 Committee R Report on Distance Learning identifies
additional issues inherent in the expansion of distance learning that
"need clarification."215 These include "the rights of a college or
university to mandate distance learning, assign faculty to teach
distance courses, use or reuse previously created faculty work, and
distribute and possibly misuse materials on computer networks
such as the Internet and the World Wide Web."2 16 Recommending
the revision of the 1969 Statement on Instructional Television to
reflect current technological developments, Committee R
reaffirmed "the fundamental importance of academic freedom in a
classroom setting, regardless of the technological medium used to
transmit the course material to the student."217Furthermore,
Committee R noted its support for the Statement on Instructional
Television by indicating that "no recording of a teacher's
presentation in the traditional classroom setting, whether for reuse
on instructional television or for any other purpose, should be
made without his prior knowledge and consent."
2 19
While the AAUP has not published a formal policy statement
governing intellectual property rights, Committee R did identify
an educational or commercial agency to produce, or otherwise
participate in, a television program as he has in arranging for
the publication of his own writings with a commercial,
university, or other nonprofit press or with a scholarly or
professional journal.
Id
213 See supra note 209 and accompanying test.
214See supra note 211.
215 COmmrrE R ON GOvERNmENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN AssOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, REPORT ON DISTANCE LEARNING (November 1997),
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two fundamental intellectual property questions regarding distance
learning: (1) Who owns, and controls, the intellectual property in a
course produced for distance learning? and, (2) How do the
different modes of transmission affect the use of materials in a
distance learning context? 219 Committee R also recommended that
the AAUP develop a policy that presumes that the ownership of all
academic work resides with the faculty member(s) who creates that
work.22 ° Specifically, Committee R urged that any future policy
apply
regardless of either the mode of transmission used
to communicate that work to its audience, or of
whether that audience consists of students sitting in
a lecture hall, readers individually reading a book or
article, small groups watching a video transmission
of a lecture or demonstration, or individuals taking
a course over a computer network, 22 1
Finally, Committee R recommended that the AAUP adopt a model
agreement to carry out such a policy.
222
Academic Mission and Policy Development
Intellectual property policies will vary for colleges and
universities depending on an institution's mission, past practices,
and goals. The continuum of possible copyright and distance
learning policy models is broad. The model that an institution
adopts will depend on its primary purpose for offering distance
learning courses.
For example, schools that have commercial development and
profit as their primary motive for offering distance learning
courses will most likely seek greater institutional control of
intellectual property. Such an institutional model will incorporate
the university's right to retain and develop copyrightable material
for the financial benefit of the institution.
2 19 
id.
220 COMMITTEE R ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
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Other institutions may be more interested in expanding the
dissemination of knowledge without emphasizing financial return.
Such institutions' missions will place less emphasis on university
intellectual property protection and dissemination of faculty
research into the public domain. The institutional model of
intellectual property ownership chosen by 'these universities
therefore is likely to place greater emphasis on faculty ownership
of the intellectual property rights to educational materials,
including lectures developed for distance learning courses.
A model which incorporates both perspectives is most likely to
follow an approach similar to that used by many research
universities in patent development for research faculty, including
an institutional preference for exclusive ownership and licensing,
flexible licensing arrangements with other institutions, and flexible
royalty sharing with faculty to induce disclosure.
Academic Culture and Economic Considerations
The powerful influence of academic culture cannot be ignored
when developing institutional copyright policy. Since the founding
of Harvard College in 1636, tenured faculty have been viewed
more as managers than as "work for hire" employees224 at colleges
and universities. Indeed, the powerful influence of academic
culture cannot be ignored when developing college and university
copyright policy, given that faculty ownership of their own
scholarship, and lecture materials has been a long-standing practice.
Both because of and despite existing copyright lawm a radical
shift to institutional claims of ownership of course materials could
yield chaos in the academy.
223 Frederick Rudolph, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A
HISTORY 4 (1962).
224 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). The Court
found that full time faculty members who develop and enforce employer policy
are managerial employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act (CN.L.R.A."). However, the National Labor Relations Board has repeatedly
found that professors at private universities may organize and are neither
managerial nor supervisory employees excluded from the protection of the
N.L.R.A. See various N.L.R.B. rulings.
See supra notes 68 et seq. and accompanying text
2000 1031
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With the enormous competition for students in higher education,
the economic influence of distance learning cannot be
underestimated. Distance learning has expanded institutional
markets. It is imperative, therefore, that, careful development of
faculty relationships with the university, especially regarding the
ownership of courses "fixed in a tangible medium," occur.
For example, even though faculty publications and lecture notes
are prepared within the scope of employment, the universal
assumption and practice has been that, absent an explicit
agreement otherwise, the authority to copyright faculty works
belongs to the faculty member rather than to the university.
Similarly, when developing course materials for distance learning,
most faculty believe that their teaching that is recorded in a fixed
and tangible medium is their own intellectual property.
The majority of current college and university copyright policies
were generally updated around 1990, subsequent to the 1986
changes in the copyright law pertaining to "Fair Use," 6 and do not
include specific identification of distance learning issues or
policies. Notwithstanding other arguments raised in this article,
institutions interested in supporting the traditional academic
culture may want to consider allowing faculty members to retain
rights to their instructional material. Such institutions could
develop long term agreements or licenses with faculty members for
the use of such material. While still recognizing the legal bases of
ownership, colleges and universities that wish to maintain a
traditional academic culture will, most likely, provide for faculty
members to retain ownership of their instructional materials.
Through the use of well-crafted, collaboratively developed,
contracts or license agreements, faculty would own their work,
while still providing the institution with flexibility in the manner in
which the course were offered.
While historically the claims of university faculty have been to
retain rights in their creative works for the intellectual or academic
value of those rights, issues in distance learning have focused
faculty concerns on questions of workload and appropriate
226 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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compensation. 7 Faculty members believe that they should be
compensated for, and retain control over, their property. Generally
the current method of faculty workload measurement is "hours per
week of formal class meetings," with some institutions
incorporating other factors, such as preparation time and office
hours.' The AAUP has recommended the following:
Faculty who have substantial additional student
enrollment in a course section due to distance
learning should be compensated by additional credit
in load assignment. Those students enrolled as
distant learning students should be considered to be
an additional class section, relative to the size of the
original class, for the purpose of load. [In addition],
faculty who teach in distance learning programs
should be additionally compensated for the extra
time required to prepare for distance learning
courses, particularly those transmitted by interactive
television. This compensation should be financial
or, preferably, in order to promote quality, in the
form of credit toward load assignment" 9
With the likelihood that the university can benefit directly from
distance learning course materials, a university's concerns
regarding copyright ownership now can be couched primarily in
financial terms. Those universities that consider distance learning
courses as primarily useful in generating tuition revenues will
argue that any economic benefit from the development of scholarly
27 See AMERICAN ASsOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON
FACULTY WORKLOAD (1970). The Association's 1970 Statement on Faculty
Workload was promulgated prior to the expansion of distance learning in the
United States. The standards articulated in the policy statement reference the
traditionally defined classroom. Nevertheless, this statement serves as the basis
of the AAUP standards for maximum faculty workload, which it defines as
follows: "[for] undergraduate instruction, a teaching load of twelve hours per
week, with no more than six separate course preparations during the academic
year. For instruction partly or entirely at the graduate level, a teaching load of
nine hours per week." Id.
n 8 Id
229 COMMITIEE R ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
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materials in the form of distance education course materials should
accrue to the university. However, if universities develop models
for copyright ownership of distance learning materials that follow
the most commonly utilized patent policies, the result will be
shared financial benefits and joint copyright ownership between
the faculty and the university."
For example, universities could draft employment contracts that
require professors to use the profits they earn to reimburse the
university for costs associated with producing their scholarship or
the university could create an arrangement allocating royalties in
proportion to the university's support of the project.?1' The
university could agree to assume the costs of defending and
enforcing the copyright in return for rights to use the materials, or
any number of other arrangements. If faculty are to receive any
financial benefits from the implementation of distance learning
courses, detailed contracts will need to be developed to govern
property rights, ownership issues, and future accessibility.
CONCLUSION
The implications of the growth of distance learning for higher
education and its multiple constituencies are significant. Students
will have increased opportunities to access curricula through
innovative approaches, faculty will be challenged to teach through
entirely new methodologies, and colleges and universities will be
able to expand their influence well beyond the boundaries of their
physical locations. To insure the effective implementation of new
distance learning programs, colleges and universities must analyze
their educational offerings and the modes of delivery for those
offerings, and consider appropriate revisions to the regulations
they have in place for governing their institutions.232 Inherent in
2M See, e.g., University of Maryland Policy on Patents
gopher://umdacc.umd.edu; Yale University Patent Policy
http://www.cis.yale.eduigrants/patent.html; and others.
23 These costs might include computer support, library, secretarial, and
research expenses, materials, and other administrative overhead.
232 But cf. Kenneth C. Green and Steven W. Gilbert, "Great Expectations:
Content, Communications, Productivity, and the Role of Information
Technology in Higher Education, " Change (Mar./Apr. 1995) at 15. Those who
[Vol 161034
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this process is a requirement that institutions update intellectual
property, specifically copyright, policies to address the new
relationships brought about by faculty use of technology in
teaching.
As colleges and universities revise their copyright policies to
incorporate distance learning agreements, they must maintain the
integrity of their academic mission, anticipate the potential
economic benefits of "virtual classrooms," and, where possible,
adapt their policies to the norms of academic culture. Institutional
leaders will need to develop procedures that balance effectively the
institution's teaching functions with the changing technology while
providing faculty with a teaching environment that complies not
only with academic customs, but with statutory requirements. The
policy must reflect the mission of the institution, guidelines for
implementation of distance learning programs, and be legally
appropriate, ethically sound, and in keeping with the academic
culture of the institution.
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